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“TRUE HUMAN COMMUNITY”: CATHOLIC SOCIAL THOUGHT, 
ARISTOTELEAN ETHICS, AND THE MORAL ORDER OF THE 
BUSINESS COMPANY 
SCOTT FITZGIBBON* 
“A business cannot be considered only as a ‘society of 
capital goods’; it is also a ‘society of persons’ . . . .” 
 
Pope John Paul II, Centesimus Annus1 
 
“Every effort must be made to ensure that the enterprise 
is indeed a true human community . . . .” 
 
Pope John XXIII, Mater et Magistra2 
 
“A great business is really too big to be human.” 
 
Henry Ford, My Life and Work3 
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Oxford.  My thanks, for their comments on this Article, to Professor James Gordley, Shannon 
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University of St. Thomas; and Professor James Murphy of Dartmouth College.  Further thanks, 
for diligent and helpful research assistance, to Jason Giannetti of Boston College Law School 
Class of 2003.  My thanks for generous financial assistance to Darald and Juliet Libby and to 
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 1. Encyclical of May 1, 1991, 43.2, AAS 83, 793.  An English translation (provided by the 
Vatican Secretariat of State) is contained in THE ENCYCLICALS OF JOHN PAUL II 587, 633 (J. 
Michael Miller, C.S.B. ed., 1996). 
 2. Encyclical of May 15, 1961, 53 AAS 401, 91, reprinted in 5 THE PAPAL ENCYCLICALS 
1958-81, 69  (Claudia Carlen, ed., 1990) (“Every effort must be made to ensure that the enterprise 
is indeed a true human community, concerned about the needs, the activities and the standing of 
each of its members.”). 
 3. HENRY FORD, MY LIFE AND WORK 263 (1923). 
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INTRODUCTION 
What obligations do people have to one another as a result of their 
membership in a business company?  To what extent, if any, ought 
management to be loyal to its workers; or workers to one another or to the 
company; or stockholders to one another?  What is the basic moral order of the 
company? 
Obligations within a business company are usually discussed at what might 
be called the systemic or “organic” level: Should workers be represented on 
the board of directors?  Do the fiduciary duties of directors run to stakeholders 
other than stockholders?  Instead, this Article asks much more basic questions, 
ones located at what might be called the “cellular” level.  Have participants in 
a business company an important commitment to foster one another’s goods 
and the good of the enterprise as a whole—in somewhat the way that citizens 
of a country may, or members of a family?  Or have they no more duties to one 
another than to unaffiliated strangers, bound to do little more than avoid harm 
and of course to keep their promises? 
Catholic social thought—encyclicals and treatises of moral theology—
often seems to recommend this “cellular” approach.  What such authorities 
have to say ought to be of general interest because they discuss goods, such as 
those of community and freedom of association, which apply for all people and 
not just Catholics.  This Article considers these authorities, whereas most 
writings on business ignore them completely.  But some of the general precepts 
in these works seem on casual examination to be impractical and even 
contradictory.  Sometimes they compare the business organization to a family; 
at other points they describe it as contractual in nature. 
Moral philosophy provides some answers.  Aristotle, especially in his 
discussion of the kinds of friendship in the Nicomachean Ethics, proves to be 
extremely helpful. 
From the Aristotelean texts, this Article derives an account of two morally 
commendable types of bonding for business organizations.  One type of 
company is bonded through “affiliations of utility.”  The other is a nexus of 
“political friendship.”  A satisfactory business company, it is here proposed, 
will be bonded in one of these two ways.  The way it should treat its 
constituents, and the way they should treat one another, depends on which type 
of company it is.  Structural and legal issues will be looked at in different 
lights according to which sort of company is involved. 
People forming up a business company ought to consider which kind of 
company to develop.  Neither kind is illicit; either kind may be appropriate; 
which type is best may depend on the exigencies of business, the nature of the 
product and the culture and wider social fabric in which the company is 
embedded.  One approach is appropriate for frontiersmen building steamboats 
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in pioneer St. Louis; another for Shakers crafting furniture in a nineteenth 
century New England village. 
Managers and owners should proceed, in establishing the company’s 
systemic (“organic”) structure and in managing the business, according to 
which form of enterprise is involved.  One type may involve readily 
transferable shares with buyback provisions, a changing ownership group, a 
strictly top-down supervisory structure and frequent dismissals of under-
performing employees.  The other type may involve restrictions on the transfer 
of shares, employee participation in major decisions and long-term loyalty 
between company and worker. 
Company pathologies often arise through confusion or deceit as to which 
form of bonding is constitutive: as for example when a chilly, “affiliation-of-
utility” sort of entity presents itself to its employees as loyal and caring. 
I.  QUENTIN PETERS (AND OTHERS) CONSIDER SOME DIFFICULT QUESTIONS 
Quentin Peters is a successful businessman.  He was baptized and 
confirmed at St. Joseph’s Catholic Church in Belmont, Massachusetts, and 
attended parochial school in that parish through sixth grade.  He graduated 
from Boston College High School in 1962 and from Boston College (B.A. 
1966, M.B.A. 1968), where he majored in the classics, with a special 
concentration on the ethical and political thought of Aristotle. 
After many years in middle and upper management at a major New 
England manufacturing company, Peters started his own firm, which produces 
footwear.  This firm—QP Corporation, organized under the business 
corporation law of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts—now has $150 
million of sales and 125 employees.  Peters owns 45% of the common stock 
and is the president and one of the three directors. 
In the course of managing the business Peters often encounters problems 
and issues that seem to him to have important ethical dimensions.  For 
example, he is concerned about: 
  1.  Jud the custodian who cannot earn enough money to live on decently, if 
by “earn” an amount we mean “produce value” of that amount.  The company 
can get independent-contractor cleaning services to do Jud’s work cheaper. 
  The company’s choices are: (1) Keep Jud on and pay him more than his 
work is worth.  (2) Fire him.  (3) Put him to work part time at spot cleanup jobs 
when the independent-contractor people are not around and pay him on a per-
hour basis: this will not give Jud enough to live on.  It is doubtful that Jud can 
obtain any other work. 
  2.  Darlene, a dedicated employee who has recently become a single parent 
and who has started leaving work early, especially when her baby is sick.  
Peters has considered terminating her employment.  Darlene has said that with 
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a substantial raise she could afford to hire top-quality child-care and perhaps a 
nurse, and that this would enable her to stay on the job during regular hours. 
  3. Ajax International, Incorporated, a conglomerate which has displayed an 
interest in acquiring QP, shutting down one of its two plants, and integrating 
management teams. 
  4.  His own—Quentin Peters’ own—outside business interests.  He has 
recently purchased some real estate that might instead have been purchased by 
QP Corporation. 
Beyond specific issues, Peters realizes that by starting and running QP 
Corporation he has developed a little political system, governed by rules and 
principles almost as extensive as those that govern a country.  Peters further 
observes that he has helped develop a little culture—a small society—shaped 
by the personalities of QP’s managers, by the architecture of QP’s facilities, 
and even by the decor of its rooms.  Peters recurrently doubts that this moral 
and cultural system is what it should be.  Is it helpful, wise and beneficial?  Is 
it merciful, charitable or even just? 
Peters notes that none of the participants in QP Corporation, other than 
those at the very top, have any real say in the company’s activities or any real 
power to shape their own roles, and that they are largely uninformed about 
what goes on outside their own departments.  A realistic portrayal would depict 
the QP employee, even most of the highly educated and intelligent employees, 
as differing little, other than in their freedom to resign, from apparatniks in the 
bureaucracy of a totalitarian regime. 
Donna and Jake are members of management of QP Corporation (Donna is 
a Vice President; Jake is the Treasurer, a Director and together with Quentin a 
co-founder of the business).  Donna and Jake have some concerns as well: 
  1.  Donna is in charge of QP’s custom-made footwear division, which 
tailor-makes footwear to customer specifications.  It is a small division, but its 
twelve employees have served it for an average of fourteen years each and 
have an especially high level of devotion to their craft and to the company.  In 
a crunch, most of them are willing to work extra hours without extra pay, and 
several of them have made a study of improving the quality of the product.  
The division is a QP flagship; each year, as a public service, it crafts a special 
pair of sports shoes for the captain of the basketball team at a prominent high 
school in a poor (and largely black and Hispanic) part of Boston.  It operates at 
a loss: demand is low because the custom-made shoes are priced at an average 
of $650 per pair.  Donna’s concerns include the following: 
a.  A recent hire into the division, Hayes, is ambitious for advancement in 
the business world and has begun taking courses at night towards the 
M.B.A. degree.  He is reluctant to work overtime and has pressed for extra 
pay.  Donna doubts that he plans to stay at QP very long. 
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b.  One of the workers in the department, Ned, is a member of a religious 
cult.  (This seems to have had no bearing on his job performance.). 
  2.  Jake holds forty percent of the common stock of QP and has received an 
attractive offer for his shares from Venture Investors, Inc., a venture-capital 
firm that specializes in taking positions in under-performing companies and 
launching vigorous programs aimed at making them more profitable.  Jake is 
tempted: one of his sons is thinking of starting a business and has asked for 
financial participation.  On the other hand, Jake suspects that Venture Investors 
would attempt gain control or substantial power at QP, press for QP to 
manufacture a higher-volume, lower-quality type of product, and try to shut 
down a QP plant that employs many disadvantaged persons. 
II.  QUENTIN PETERS FINDS FEW EASY ANSWERS IN TREATISES ON MORAL 
THEOLOGY OR IN PAPAL ENCYCLICALS 
Looking through manuals of moral theology, Peters encounters passages 
such as the following: 
THE FOURTH COMMANDMENT 
The Fourth Commandment is: “Honour thy father and thy mother . . . .”  The 
mutual obligations of parent and child may be extended to all who hold an 
analogous position towards each other, and so under this heading theologians 
commonly treat the mutual obligations of other relations, and of superiors and 
subjects . . . . 
THE DUTIES OF MASTERS AND SERVANTS 
Servant is here understood . . . as to comprise both domestic servants and 
workmen who work for a master.  The relation in modern times arises out of a 
contract freely entered into by the parties, and it is less intimate than that which 
in ancient times subsisted between the lord and the slave or serf.  In spite of 
this, however, the nexus of cash payment is not the only bond between master 
and servant.  By the very fact that one enters into the service of another, the 
latter becomes his superior, assumes the duty of caring for him and in fitting 
proportion he acquires a claim to those marks of honour and reverence which 
are due to all who exercise authority over us. . . . [Servants] are bound to show 
their masters due honour and respect . . . . 
. . . . 
“The following duties bind the wealthy owner and the employer: not to look 
upon their work people as their bondsmen, but to respect in every man his 
dignity as a person ennobled by Christian character . . . .  [T]he employer is 
bound to see that the worker has time for his religious duties; that he be not 
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exposed to corrupting influences and dangerous occasions; and that he be not 
led away to neglect his home and family, or to squander his earnings.” 
. . . . 
“[W]orking man and the employer should make free agreements, and in 
particular let them agree freely as to the wages; nevertheless, there underlies a 
dictate of natural justice more imperious and more ancient than any bargain 
between man and man, namely, that the wages ought not to be insufficient to 
support the frugal and well-behaved wage earner . . . .” 
The contract of hiring may be terminated by mutual consent of the parties 
concerned, or for just cause by one of the parties, provided that the laws and 
customs which regulate the matter be duly observed. . . .  If, however, the 
servant is incompetent to do what he undertook, is habitually disobedient, or is 
guilty of immorality, or unlawfully absents himself from his work, he may be 
dismissed without notice.4 
Inspecting these passages, Peters concludes that they address only the 
employment relationship.  Even in that regard he finds them unhelpful.  What 
light do they shed on the problems of Jud and Darlene?  If Peters puts Jud into 
a part-time slot and pays him reduced wages for his reduced work, is Peters 
guilty of violating his obligation to compensate workers sufficiently to 
maintain them in “frugal comfort”?  If he terminates Jud, is he violating the 
prohibition against firing without “just cause”?  Or can he conclude that Jud is 
“incompetent to do what he undertook” (even though Jud is pushing the broom 
no slower than when he was hired)?  As to Darlene, can Peters fire her because 
she has “absented herself from work”?  The passage quoted applies the 
limitation “unlawfully” (“unlawfully absents himself from work”)  but surely, 
Peters reasons, you can fire workers for walking off the job even lawfully.  At 
least one can fire them for walking off the job unjustifiably—perhaps that is 
what the text really means.  But then, Darlene has a justification in the form of 
a sick baby.  Does Peters have an obligation to accommodate her, either by 
letting her leave work early or by raising her pay to the point where she can 
afford more childcare, even a nurse?  A just wage, from the encyclical cited, 
includes enough to support one’s children.5  If he gives her a raise, should he 
also raise the salaries of other workers of similar seniority and rank?  If he 
gives such raises, will he commit an act of injustice to the stockholders? 
 
 4. 1 THOMAS SLATER, A MANUAL OF MORAL THEOLOGY FOR ENGLISH-SPEAKING 
COUNTRIES 176, 186-89 (5th ed. 1907) (Slater’s letters and numbers identifying paragraphs have 
been omitted, as have his footnotes).  The long subquotes are from Leo XIII, Rerum Novarum, 
May 15, 1891, 20, 45, 23 AAS 641.  A full translation—not identical to that in Slater—is in 2 
THE PAPAL ENCYCLICALS 1878-1903, 241, 246 (Claudia Carlen, ed., 1990). 
 5. Leo XIII, Rerum Novarum, May 15, 1891, supra note 4, at 46. 
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What light do the above-quoted passages shed on the possibility of closing 
one of the QP plants or its custom shoe department?  Could the workers in 
those departments then be laid off?  What light is shed on Peters’ concerns that 
his employees are becoming mindless apparatniks? 
Off the subject of worker relations, the above-quoted treatise lapses into 
silence.  Peters finds no help on the question of Jake’s prospective sale of his 
stock to a venture capital firm.  Is there a close bond of loyalty between one 
stockholder and another; between a stockholder and his firm?  American 
judicial decisions discuss this issue,6 but treatises on moral theology do not. 
Nor can Peters easily resolve his problems by probing for underlying 
principles.  Beneath the surface of the text, he will encounter the elements of 
two very different approaches.  One might be called the “close affiliational.”  It 
is reflected by the use of terms such as “honor,” “reverence,” and “faith,” by 
the conclusion that the employer “has the duty of caring for” the employee, 
and by the organization of the entire subject under the Fourth Commandment, 
among chapters on the relationship of parent and child, guardian and ward, 
husband and wife, and ruler and subject.  Another approach can be called the 
“contractual.”  It is reflected in the statement near the beginning of the above-
quoted passage that “[t]he [employment] relation in modern times arises out of 
a contract freely entered into by the parties.”  Elsewhere in the treatise there is 
a passage on contracts (Book VII—not organized under any commandment 
and not clearly related to the rest of the treatise).  That passage gives a modern, 
“chilly” account of contract and bases the parties’ relationship on rights and 
duties they have jointly willed to undertake.7 
If Peters looks at other treatises on moral theology he will find a similar 
bifurcation,8 and if he is diligent enough to examine primary Magisterial 
 
 6. See, e.g., Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 328 N.E.2d 505 (Mass. 1975) (recognizing a 
fiduciary duty among shareholders in closely held corporations), limited in Wilkes v. Springside 
Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657 (Mass. 1976); Citron v. Steego Corp., No. 10171, 1988 Del. 
Ch. LEXIS 119 (Del. Ch. Sept. 9, 1988) (refusing to impose fiduciary duties on a 48% 
stockholder).  See generally 2 F. O’NEAL & R. THOMPSON, OPPRESSION OF MINORITY 
SHAREHOLDERS §10.04 (2d ed. 1985); Lawrence Mitchell, Death of Fiduciary Duty in Close 
Corporations, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1675 (1990); AMERICAN LEGAL INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS Part V, Introductory Note b 
(1994) (“A controlling shareholder . . . is . . . subject to a duty of fair dealing.”). 
 7. SLATER, supra note 4, at 300, 305 (“[A] contract imposes a perfect and serious 
obligation on the parties, an obligation which they voluntarily take upon themselves, and which is 
not imposed from without. . . . [A contract] is an agreement of wills; one renounces a right in 
favour of the other who accepts it . . . .  The matter must be determinate or capable at least of 
being determined, otherwise the terms of the contract will be too vague, and no agreement of 
wills on the same matter is possible.”). 
 8. An exception is GERMAIN GRISEZ, THE WAY OF THE LORD JESUS (1983-97), especially 
Volume Three: DIFFICULT MORAL QUESTIONS (1997), which, for example, discusses the case of 
a stockholder in a closely held company who is thinking of dumping his stock, see id. at 500-02, 
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authorities he will encounter them yet again.  The encyclical Rerum Novarum 
displays the same tension.  It states, at one point, that the workman and 
employer should, as a rule, make free agreements, but it shortly thereafter 
alludes to “a dictate of natural justice more imperious and ancient than any 
bargain . . . namely, that wages ought not to be insufficient to support a . . . 
wage-earner . . . .”9 
Some authorities seem to suggest that Catholic thought mandates intimacy 
among participants in all business organizations.  The Catechism, referring to a 
“principle of solidarity” which is “a direct demand of human and Christian 
brotherhood,” states that “[s]ocio-economic problems can be resolved only 
with the help of all the forms of solidarity: solidarity of the poor among 
themselves, between rich and poor, of workers among themselves, between 
employers and employees in a business . . . .”10  Pius XI stated in the encyclical 
Quadragesimo Anno: “We consider it advisable . . . in the present condition of 
human society that, so far as is possible, the work-contract be somewhat 
modified by a partnership-contract . . . . Workers and other employees thus 
become sharers in ownership or management or participate in some fashion in 
the profits received.”11  One of the teachings of the Second Vatican Council is 
that, “[i]n business enterprises . . . the active participation of everybody in 
 
and the cases of managers who are considering whether to dismiss employees, see id. at 481-85, 
524-27. 
 9. Leo XIII, Rerum Novarum, May 15, 1891, supra note 4.  See Second Council of the 
Vatican, Gaudium et spes 67 (Dec. 7, 1965), translated into English as “Pastoral Constitution on 
the Church in the Modern World,” in VATICAN COUNCIL II: THE CONCILIAR AND POST 
CONCILIAR DOCUMENTS 903, 973 (Austin Flannery, O.P., ed., Roman Lennon, O. Carm., trans., 
1975) (“remuneration for work should guarantee man the opportunity to provide a dignified 
livelihood for himself and his family . . . to correspond to the role and the productivity of each.”).  
For a discussion of the influence of Enlightenment doctrines on this Rerum novarum, see Ernest 
Fortin, “Sacred and Inviolable”: Rerum Novarum and Natural Rights, 53 THEOLOGICAL STUDIES 
203 (1992).  See also MATTHEW HABIGER, O.S.B., PAPAL TEACHING ON PRIVATE PROPERTY 
1891-1981, 343 et seq. (1990). 
 10. CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH ¶¶1939, 1941 (1994). 
 11. Paragraph 65, AAS 23, 177-228 (1931), translated as ON RECONSTRUCTING THE 
SOCIAL ORDER (Francis J. Haas & Martin R.P. McGuire, trans., 1942), reprinted in THE PAPAL 
ENCYCLICALS 1903-39, 415, 426  (Claudia Carlen, ed., 1990) and in THE COMPANION TO THE 
CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH: A COMPENDIUM OF TEXTS REFERRED TO IN THE 
CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH 641, 654 (1994).  Another passage of interest from 
Quadragesimo Anno is the following: 
It is obvious that, as in the case of ownership, so in the case of work, especially work 
hired out to others, there is a social aspect also to be considered in addition to the personal 
or individual aspect.  For man’s productive effort cannot yield its fruits unless a truly 
social and organic body exists, unless a social and juridical order watches over the 
exercise of work, unless the various occupations, being interdependent, cooperate with 
and mutually complete one another, and, what is still more important, unless mind, 
material things and work combine and form as it were a single whole. 
Id. ¶69; THE PAPAL ENCYCLICALS 1903-39, supra note 4, at 426. 
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administration is to be encouraged.”12  On the other hand, Pius XII described 
the supposed right of economic co-management as “outside the field of 
possibilities.”13 
Are these approaches reconcilable?  Peters seems to be led towards treating 
Jud and Darlene one way if he regards them as close affiliates like members of 
a family, but towards quite a different approach if he regards them as mere 
holders of contract rights.  Jake seems to have stronger duties to Peters and to 
QP Corporation under one approach than under the other.  Under one 
approach, it seems Peters must bear with Jud and Darlene and keep them on as 
employees and that Jake must bear with QP Corporation and not sell his stock 
to Venture Investors.  Under the other approach, it seems that terminations of 
the relationships are fully justified.14 
Peters’ dissatisfaction with the treatises of moral theology is aggravated 
when he reflects on what they do not contain: notably, discussions of 
efficiency and the desiderata of producing a good product and selling it cheap 
and of making the business grow larger and more profitable.  Peters is not an 
altar boy any longer, and he is as much impressed with profit and growth as is 
the average businessman and almost as much as the average business school 
professor.  The treatises on moral theology seem to ignore those goals.  They 
seem to present a primitive, household-based model for the business which 
may accurately reflect the familial origin of many companies, ancient and 
modern,15 but to ignore a fundamental distinction: businesses aim at producing 
 
 12. Second Council of the Vatican, Gaudium et spes 67 (Dec. 7, 1965), translated into 
English as “Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World,” in VATICAN COUNCIL II: 
THE CONCILIAR AND POST CONCILIAR DOCUMENTS 903, 973 (Austin Flannery, O.P., ed., Roman 
Lennon, O. Carm., trans., 1975) (“while taking into account the role of every person concerned—
owners, employers, management, and employees—and without weakening the necessary 
executive unity”). 
 13. Pius XII, Speech to the International Congress of Social Studies (June 3, 1950), AAS 42, 
487.  Another statement by Pius XII of interest is the following: “They would be wrong who 
affirmed that every particular enterprise is by its nature a society, so that relations between those 
who have parts to play in it should be regulated by distributive justice and all without 
distinction—be they owners or not of the means of production—have a right to their part of the 
property or, at least, of the profits of the enterprise.”  Pius XII, Speech to U.N.I.A.P.A.C. (May 7, 
1949), AAS 41, 285.  For a discussion of Pius XII’s views on such matters, see JEAN-YVES 
CALVEZ  & JACQUES PERRIN, THE CHURCH AND SOCIAL JUSTICE: THE SOCIAL TEACHING OF 
THE POPES FROM LEO XII TO PIUS XII 279 et seq. (J.R. Kirwin, trans., 1961). 
 14. American contract law usually regards an employment contract as terminable at will 
without cause.  E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 7.17, 513-15 (3d ed. 1999); Richard 
Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 947 (1984). 
 15. See, e.g., BLANCHE HAZARD, THE ORGANIZATION OF THE BOOT AND SHOE INDUSTRY 
IN MASSACHUSETTS BEFORE 1875 (1921) (thoroughly describing the evolution of the footwear 
industry from its origins in the household); IRIS ORIGO, THE MERCHANT OF PRATO (1957) 
(describing in amazing detail the Fourteenth Century life of Francesco Datini and his trading 
companies which, though large and far-flung, maintained many characteristics of familiality 
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and selling a product and at making profit, families do not.  Businesses seem to 
have an external intentionality; families seem to aim inwards at the good of 
their members. 
III.  MAINSTREAM THEORY ENDORSES A CONTRACTUALIST APPROACH BUT IS 
BUILT ON A SHAKY ETHICAL FOUNDATION 
A.  A Leading Mainstream View 
If Peters turns, dissatisfied, from the moral theology treatises to current 
mainstream thought about the business organization, he will encounter an 
emphatic endorsement of a contractual approach.  A business organization, 
Judge Easterbrook and Professor Fischel tell us, is a “nexus of contracts” 
among equity holders, lenders, managers and workers: 
  Everything to do with the relation between the firm and the suppliers of 
labor (employees), goods and services (suppliers and contractors) is 
contractual . . . .  Just so with the rules in force when the firm raises money—
whether by issuing debt, the terms of which are often negotiated at great length 
over a table, or by issuing equity, the terms of which affect the price of the 
issue.16 
B.  Theoretical Foundations of this Leading View 
This view rests on two pillars.  One, anthropological in nature, depicts the 
person as an “economic man,” consistently (“rationally”) seeking to maximize 
his utility17 or his preferences.18  The second, ethical in nature—the utilitarian 
 
among their members); JOSEPH FRAZIER WALL, ALFRED I. DUPONT: THE MAN AND HIS FAMILY 
(1990) (describing the DuPont company which, during many generations, remained a family 
concern).  See generally ALLAN C. CARLSON, FROM COTTAGE TO WORK STATION: THE 
FAMILY’S SEARCH FOR SOCIAL HARMONY IN THE INDUSTRIAL AGE 1 (1993) (“For over a 
millennium, householding had been the dominant economic pattern . . . .  Household production, 
ranging from tool making and weaving to the keeping of livestock and the garden patch, bound 
each family together as a basic economic unit, a ‘community of work.’”). 
 16. FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
CORPORATE LAW 16 (1991).  This work uses the term “nexus of contracts” at page 12 and 
portrays the company that way passim and especially at pages 9-12 and 16-17.  But see Victor 
Brudney, Contract and Fiduciary Duty in Corporate Law, 38 B.C. L. REV. 595 (1997); Victor 
Brudney, Corporate Governance, Agency Costs and the Rhetoric of Contract, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 
1403 (1985).  For objections to the contractarian model as applied to the relationship between 
firm and workers, see Kent Greenfield, The Place of Workers in Corporate Law, 39 B.C. L. REV. 
293 (1998) and works cited. 
 17. AMARTYA SEN, ON ETHICS AND ECONOMICS 80 (1987) (“In the usual economic 
literature a person is seen as maximizing his utility function, which determines all his choices.”).  
See George Stigler, Economics or Ethics?, in 2 TANNER LECTURES ON HUMAN VALUES 143, 190 
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ethic—identifies the good as the maximization of pleasure19 or the satisfaction 
of preferences.20 
The anthropology compels the conclusion that normally people affiliate 
each for their own benefit, conferring goods on the other only as a quid pro 
quo, only as a means to getting something better back.21  So it must also be 
with contracts.  The market, Judge Easterbrook and Professor Fischel tell us, is 
an “extended conflict among selfish people”;22 contracts in the marketplace, 
the conclusion seems clear, are encounters in this conflict.  The ethics suggest 
that exchanges of this sort are usually a good thing: each person is usually the 
 
(Sterling M. MacMurrin ed., 1981) (“[W]e live in a world of reasonably well-informed people 
acting intelligently in pursuit of their self-interests.”). 
 18. The preference-based account is described in Martin Hollis & Robert Sugden, 
Rationality in Action, 102 MIND 1, 5-7 (1993) and in Amartya Sen, The Formulation of Rational 
Choice, 84 AM. EC. REV. 385 (1994). 
 19. Pleasure-based utilitarianism “holds that actions are right in proportion as they tend to 
promote happiness; wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness.  By happiness is 
intended pleasure and the absence of pain; by unhappiness, pain and the privation of pleasure.”  
JOHN STUART MILL, UTILITARIANISM 18 (Samuel Gorovitz, ed., 1971). 
 20. See John Harsanyi, Rule Utilitarianism and Decision Theory, 11 ERKENNTNIS 25 
(1977). 
 21. An exception is the situation in which the parties’ utilities are “interdependent.”  See 
Richard A. Posner, Gratuitous Promises in Economics and Law, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 411 (1977).  
Recent studies have been expanding the understanding of interdependent utilities and reporting a 
preference for fair or equal outcomes in many situations.  See, e.g., Guiseppe Lopomo & Efe 
Oko, Bargaining, Interdependence, and the Rationality of Fair Division, 32 RAND J. ECON. 
(forthcoming).  The literature is discussed in Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law 
and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1489-97 (1998).  A response by Judge Posner concedes 
much of the criticism: Richard A. Posner, Rational Choice, Behavioral Economics, and the Law, 
50 STAN. L. REV. 1551, 1558-59 (1998).  Posner states: 
The picture that JST paint . . . is of a person who has trouble thinking straight or taking 
care for the future but who at the same time is actuated by a concern with being fair to 
other people, including complete strangers.  This may be a psychologically realistic 
picture of the average person, and it responds to the familiar complaint that ‘economic 
man’ is unrecognizable in real life.  But in theory-making, descriptive accuracy is 
purchased at a price, the price being loss of predictive power . . . . 
See also id. at 1561-62, where Ponser notes that 
our instincts are easily fooled when confronted with conditions to which human beings 
never had a chance to adapt biologically.  That is why . . . people can love an adopted 
infant as much as they would their own biological child . . . .  Voting, giving to charities, 
and refraining from littering, in circumstances in which there is neither visible reward for 
these cooperative behaviors nor visible sanctions for defection, may illustrate an 
instinctual, and as it were biologically mistaken, generalization of cooperation from 
small-group interactions, in which altruism is rewarded . . . and failures to reciprocate 
punished, to large-group interactions in which the prospects of reward and punishment are 
so slight that cooperation ceases to be rational . . . . 
 22. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 16, at 8. 
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best judge of his own utility23 and therefore when two people decide on an 
exchange it is usually good, as best as we can judge, for each.24 
Business companies can be analyzed this way: perhaps so should all 
organizations and relationships,25 even the household26 and the state; even 
fiduciary relationships like those of trusts;27 anyway certainly business 
organizations.  People who form business companies give money, goods or 
services in exchanges each judges to be good for himself; they are the best 
judges of that; we should concur. 
C. Implications for the Structure and Purposes of the Company 
At the company-formation bargaining table, the participants, each seeking 
his own utility, hammer out a bargain that creates a firm optimally designed to 
maximize profit.28  The various participant-firm relationships will be fixed 
with this goal dominant: sharp-in, sharp-out contracts (like for suppliers), long-
term contracts involving ongoing direction and control (for employees), 
contracts for fixed compensation (for creditors and employees), and 
 
 23. According to the preference utilitarian view each defines his own utility. 
 24. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 14 (4th ed. 1992) (hereinafter 
POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS) (“Where resources are shifted pursuant to [a voluntary 
transaction], we can be reasonably sure that the shift involves an increase in efficiency.”).  See 
EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 16, at 38 (“In a market economy, each party to a 
transaction is better off.”).  Similar views appear in JOHN STUART MILL, ELEMENTS OF 
POLITICAL ECONOMY 125-26 (3d ed. 1844), and JEREMY BENTHAM, GENERAL VIEW OF A 
COMPLETE CODE OF LAWS, CH. XVI, in 3 THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 155, 190 (John 
Bowring, ed., 1962). 
 25. See John H. Langbein, The Contractarian Basis of the Law of Trusts, 105 YALE L.J. 625, 
630 (1995) (“Contract has become the dominant doctrinal current in modern American law.  In 
fields ranging from corporations and partnership, to landlord and tenant, to servitudes, to the law 
of marriage, scholars have come to understand our legal rules as resting mainly on imputed 
bargains that are susceptible to alteration by actual bargains.”). 
 26. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON (1992); POSNER, ECONOMIC 
ANALYSIS, supra note 24, at 5. 
 27. Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Contract and Fiduciary Duty, 36 J. L. & 
ECON. 425, 427 (1993) (“Fiduciary duties are not special duties; they have no moral footing; they 
are the same sort of obligations, derived and enforced in the same way, as other contractual 
undertakings.”); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel Fischel, Corporate Control Transactions, 91 
YALE L.J. 698, 702 (1982) (“[T]he fiduciary principal is fundamentally a standard term in a 
contract.”).  See also Scott FitzGibbon, Fiduciary Relationships Are Not Contracts, 82 MARQ. L. 
REV. 303 (1999). 
 28. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 16, at 6 (“[S]elf-interested entrepreneurs and 
managers, just like other investors, are driven to find the devices most likely to maximize net 
profits.  If they do not, they pay for their mistakes because they receive lower prices for corporate 
paper.”). 
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arrangements for residual remuneration—what’s left over (for equity 
holders).29 
The implications of this mainstream view for the issues that concern 
Quentin, Donna, and Jake seem clear: it suggests, for example, ready 
termination of relationships not firmly established in contractual 
specifications.30  Mainstream ethics and anthropology imply relational 
minimalism. 
D. Shortcomings of Utilitarian Ethics and Anthropology 
If Peters pursues these theories assiduously, he will discover that their 
theoretical bases are shaky: widely rejected, and deservedly so, in much 
modern scholarship.31  Another thing Peters will quickly notice is that these 
views are incompatible with the fundamentals of Aristotelean ethics and 
Catholic moral theology: 
 
 29. Id. at 36 (the normal outcome will involve “employees and debt investors holding rights 
to fixed payoffs and equity investors holding a residual claim to profits, which other investors 
promise to maximize”). 
 30. See Epstein, supra note 14.  See also Jordan v. Duff  Phelps, Inc., 815 F.2d 429 (7th Cir. 
1987), in which Judges Easterbrook and Posner disagreed bitterly over the extent to which a 
company had disclosure obligations to an employee who was considering cashing in his stock 
options and resigning. 
 31. As to the anthropology: critical literature is identified in Bruno S. Frey & Alois Stutzer, 
What Can Economists Learn from Happiness Research?, http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf? 
abstract_id=271816 (Center for Economic Studies & Ifo Institute for Economic Research 
Working Paper No. 503, University of Zurich Working Paper No. 80, June 2001) (criticizing the 
preference-based approach), in Jolls et al., supra note 21, at 1489-97, and in Donald C. 
Langevoort, Behavioral Theories of Judgment and Decision Making in Legal Scholarship: A 
Literature Review, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1499, 1499-1508 (1998); for another important authority 
see Sen, supra note 18, at 386 (“A divergence between choice and well-being can easily arise 
when behavior is influenced by some motivation other than the pursuit of one’s own interest or 
welfare (e.g., through a sense of commitment, or respect for duty).”).  As to the ethics: among 
many telling criticisms see JOHN FINNIS, MORAL ABSOLUTES 17-24 (1991) (the 
incommensurability objection); Philippa Foot, Utilitarianism and the Virtues, in 
CONSEQUENTIALISM AND ITS CRITICS 224, 237 (Samuel Scheffler, ed., 1988) (discussing the 
unacceptable implications for harming the innocent argument).  As to ethics applied to 
economics, see POSNER, supra note 24, at 13, 27 (conceding, probably, the insufficiency of 
utilitarianism and utilitarian-based economics); Martha C. Nussbaum, Flawed Foundations: The 
Philosophical Critique of a Particular Type of Economics, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1197 (1997).  As to 
the ethics and anthropology as applied to corporate law, see Kent Greenfield, Using Behavioral 
Economics to Show the Power and Efficiency of Corporate Law as a Regulatory Tool, Boston 
College of Law and Economics Working Paper No. 01-02 (draft of July 8, 2001), available online 
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=276168. 
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1. Utilitarian Ethics 
Pleasure is a good, according to Aristotle and according to the Catholic 
tradition, only in a secondary way.  Pleasure often constitutes an incentive to 
good action: for example the pleasure of eating leads a person to nourish 
himself and the pleasure of running well attracts people to track.  Further, 
Aquinas tells us, delectatio adds a completion or perfection to a good action;32 
in Aristotle’s charming phrase, “as the bloom of youth does on those in the 
flower of their age.”33  But pleasure is not the basic point; rather, the basic 
good for man is eudaemonia or beatitudo; knowing, loving and serving God; 
good action is a part of this;34 and preeminently good action done for the best 
reasons.  An athlete who competed well for pleasure alone, not apprehending 
the excellence of a strong and well-trained body or a fast and well-run race, 
would miss the point.  An athlete who prepared and competed badly, seduced 
by the pleasures of overeating and undertraining, would not be acting well or 
participating, to that extent, in eudaemonia or beatitudo.35  The economic man 
(the type who exclusively pursues “utility” in the Benthamist understanding) is 
not a fully good person—he is often a bad person—according to Aristotelean 
ethics and Catholic moral theology. 
Similar conclusions apply to preference utilitarianism.  Getting what you 
prefer has a certain element of good in it, connected to the good of freedom.  
Freedom can be instrumental to goods just as the freedom to run is 
instrumental to the athletic life.  Furthermore, getting beyond instrumentalism, 
 
 32. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica I-II q. 34 ad. 3 in I ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA 
THEOLOGICA 739 (Fathers of the English Dominican Province, trans., 1947) (“an operation 
cannot be perfectly good, unless there be also pleasure in the good”).  See generally JOHN FINNIS, 
AQUINAS: MORAL, POLITICAL, AND LEGAL THEORY (1998), which at several points, e.g. at 72-
78, provides a thorough discussion.  See also CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH  ¶1770 
(1994) (“Moral perfection consists in man’s being moved to the good not by his will alone, but 
also by his sensitive appetite, as in the words of the psalm: ‘My heart and flesh sing for joy to the 
living God.’”) (quoting Psalm 84:2). 
 33. NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 1174b. Here and throughout this Article the translation of the 
Nicomachean ethics is that by W.D. Ross, as revised by J.O. Urmson, in II THE COMPLETE 
WORKS OF ARISTOTLE: THE REVISED OXFORD TRANSLATION 1729 (Jonathan Barnes, ed., 1984) 
(hereinafter NICOMACHEAN ETHICS). 
 34. In Aquinas, beatitudo perfecta is constituted by the life of contemplation; but beatitudo 
imperfecta involves the active life; and good action in such a life is not just a means of attaining 
to contemplation nor is the active life a failed contemplative life.  An intense and learned 
discussion of the various Thomist texts to these effects is located in FINNIS, supra note 31, at 104-
10.   
 35. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica I-II q. 34 a. 1 c., in I ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, 
SUMMA THEOLOGICA 736-37 (Fathers of the English Dominican Province, trans., 1947) 
(“[S]ome pleasures are good, and . . . some are evil.  For pleasure is a repose of the appetitive 
power in some loved good . . . .  [T]here is a good pleasure, whereby the higher or lower appetite 
rests in that which is in accord with reason; and an evil pleasure, whereby the appetite rests in that 
which is discordant from reason and the law of God.”). 
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freedom is a sort of component of the good (athletic competition under 
compulsion is not so eudaemonic as is athletic competition through free 
choice).  The free man, unlike the man under compulsion, acts because of 
goods he understands and intends; and by doing so he brings them into himself 
and develops his character for the better.36  This account indicates that the 
good of freedom is wrapped up in the good of the intentions of the person who 
exercises it.  Someone who acts frivolously, without important intentions or 
purposes—someone who acts just “to do it my way”—does not participate in 
the good of freedom.37  For example, someone whose understanding of the 
good is limited to “my preferences” does not participate in the good of 
freedom.  Worse yet, someone whose intentions are thoroughly bad does not 
realize the goods of freedom.  The athlete who exercises a preference for too 
much fatty food before a race is not a eudaemonic runner at all.38  The 
economic man of the preference-utilitarian variety is not fully a good person 
according to the Aristotelean and Catholic traditions. 
Both Benthamite and preference utilitarianism are forms of 
consequentialism or proportionalism, and so fall under the guns of the 
condemnations of such theories contained in the encyclical Veritatis 
Splendor.39  Catholic moral theology condemns some actions even when 
desirable results accrue from them.40 
 
 36. A fuller account of the good of freedom is in Scott FitzGibbon, The Failure of the 
Freedom-Based and Utilitarian Arguments for Assisted Suicide, 42 AM. J. JURIS. 211, 212-19 
(1997), relying in part on KAROL WOJTYLA, THE ACTING PERSON (Andrzej Potocki, trans., 
Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka, collaborator, 1979). 
 37. This view is derived from Harry Frankfurt, Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a 
Person, 68 J. PHIL. 5 (1971). 
 38. The thesis that bad actions do not involve the good of freedom or autonomy is ably 
stated and defended in  ROBERT P. GEORGE, MAKING MEN MORAL: CIVIL LIBERTIES AND 
PUBLIC MORALITY 173-82 (1993), and in JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM (1986).  
See CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH  ¶1733 (1994) (“There is no true freedom except in 
the service of what is good and just.”).  A similar argument about constitutional and other 
juridical issues is advanced in JOHN H. GARVEY, WHAT ARE FREEDOMS FOR? (1996). 
  A more complex problem about freedom arises if one asks, not “what actions instantiate 
the good of freedom for the actor,” but “what options, extended to people by others, are likely to 
enhance their participation in the good of freedom.”  (This latter question is directly relevant for 
people like lawmakers and builders of social groups).  Perhaps leaving someone the choice to do 
something bad enhances the good for him (if he freely refrains and does good instead). 
 39. John Paul II,  Encyclical Letter of  August 6, 1993, 85 AAS 1133, translated in  THE 
ENCYCLICALS OF JOHN PAUL II 674 (J. Michael Miller, C.S.B., ed., 1996). 
 40. FINNIS, supra note 31; GRISEZ, supra note 8, Volume One; Germain Grisez, Moral 
Absolutes: A Critique of the View of Josef Fuchs, S.J., 1985 ANTHROPOS 176; Germain Grisez et 
al., Practical Principles, Moral Truth, and Ultimate Ends, 32 AM. J. JURIS. 99 (1987). 
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2. Utilitarian Anthropology 
Man often seeks pleasure, but the Aristotelean and Catholic traditions 
insist that he aspires to more than that and shapes his life under the guidance of 
other influences as well.  For example: 
Passions and appetites.  These cannot be described as though they were 
simply constructs of pleasures and pains.  Consider the appetite of hunger and 
the passion of anger: in moderation each may be somewhat pleasant; in excess 
each can be very painful; each presses on towards resolution in its own 
characteristic way, hunger urging us to eat, anger to acts of retribution or 
reprisal. 
The promptings of conscience.  Gaudium et Spes states: 
Deep within his conscience man discovers a law which he has not laid upon 
himself but which he must obey.  Its voice, ever calling him to love and to do 
what is good and avoid evil, tells him inwardly at the right moment: do this, 
shun that.  For man has in his heart a law inscribed by God . . . .  His 
conscience is man’s most secret core, and his sanctuary.  There he is alone 
with God whose voice echoes in his depths.41 
The desire for happiness (and the related appetency to develop and to 
deploy one’s capacities to the fullest).42  The Olympic runner would likely 
choose to carry on with the race and with his career as a runner even in the face 
of pain or the deprivation of pleasure; Beethoven continued caring about music 
even after he became deaf.  The development of Aristotelean eudaemonia is a 
human telos.  As Aristotle says: “[T]here are many things we should be keen 
about even if they brought no pleasure.  If pleasures necessarily do accompany 
these, that makes no odds; we should choose these even if no pleasure 
resulted.”43 
The development of one’s capacities in a full and integrated way and the 
deployment of one’s capacities consistently in a complete and mature life is a 
good which all to some extent seek.  Few would choose to spend their lives in 
Robert Nozick’s “experience machine” how ever much pleasure it afforded 
them, if it meant the sacrifice of maturity and integrity.44  And as Aristotle 
says, “no one would choose to live with the intellect of a child throughout his 
 
 41. Second Council of the Vatican, Gaudium et spes 16 (Dec. 7, 1965), translated into 
English as “Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World,” in VATICAN COUNCIL II: 
THE CONCILIAR AND POST CONCILIAR DOCUMENTS 903, 916 (Austin Flannery, O.P., ed., Roman 
Lennon, O. Carm., trans., 1975). 
 42. See CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH ¶1718 (1994) (referring to “the natural 
desire for happiness.  God has placed it in the human heart in order to draw man to the One who 
alone can fulfill it.”). 
 43. Id. 
 44. See ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA 42-43 (1974). 
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life, however much he were to be pleased at the things that children are pleased 
at  . . . .”45 
The natural appetency to form friendships, families, and other groups (and 
to participate in them in a way that makes them succeed as components of the 
eudaemonia or beatitudo of the members).  Happiness for a person includes his 
possessing and exercising the social virtues of justice and friendship. 
E. Some Conclusions 
Peters cannot reasonably base his governance of QP Corporation on the 
maximization of pleasure, the satisfaction of preferences, or an anthropology 
which caricatures as “economic men” persons such as Donna, Jake, Jud, and 
Darlene.  He really cannot make of it the “extended conflict among selfish 
people” which underlies this mainstream approach.  He is left looking for other 
bases for approaching the problem of making QP Corporation a “true human 
community.” 
IV. AFFILIATION AND COMMUNITY ACCORDING TO ARISTOTLE. 
Peters therefore turns to Aristotle—the greatest classical source for 
Catholic ethics and Western philosophy generally. 
The basic unit of human bonding in Aristotle is identified with the word 
philos.  The term is usually translated “friend,” but might be more cautiously 
translated “affiliate,” since to call someone philos identifies him as in some 
way one’s own (as belonging to oneself and as not being a stranger) but does 
not establish that the relationship is really close or that it involves strong 
feelings.46  Man needs affiliates and finds it hard to live well without them.  
“For without philov no one would choose to live, though he had all other 
 
 45. Other translators use the term “mind of a child”, e.g. H. Rackham (1934) and J.E.C. 
Welldon (undated); Terence Irwin (1985) uses the phrase “child’s [level of] thought” (bracketed 
material from Irwin). 
 46. In the POETICS (1453b 14-15), Aristotle “divides all human relationships into only three 
categories—that of philoi, enemies, and neutrals.”  ELIZABETH S. BELFIORE, MURDER AMONG 
FRIENDS: VIOLATION OF PHILIA IN GREEK TRAGEDY 5 (2000).  See also PAUL MILLET, LENDING 
AND BORROWING IN ANCIENT ATHENS 109-26 (1991) (concurring in the view that Aristotle in 
general uses the words related to philos in a comprehensive way).  See generally P. CHANTRAINE, 
ETUDES SUR LE VOCABULAIRE GREC 15 (1956), quoted in I CESLAS SPICQ, O.P., THEOLOGICAL 
LEXICON OF THE NEW TESTAMENT 10 n.15 (James D. Ernest, trans., 1994) (The term “philos” in 
general [that is not with specific reference to Aristotle’s usage] “literally expresses not an 
emotional attachment, but belonging to a social group.”).  But see DAVID KONSTAN, FRIENDSHIP 
IN THE CLASSICAL WORLD 55-56, 68 (1997) (identifying a big difference between philos on the 
one hand and philein and philia on the other).  Authorities on Homeric philos and its connections 
to the Aristotelean version are described in SUZANNE STERN-GILLET, ARISTOTLE’S PHILOSOPHY 
OF FRIENDSHIP 6-7 (1995). 
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goods.”47  Man is an affiliating animal. He is, furthermore, a politikon 
animal,48 and “not only a political but also a house-holding animal” and a 
partnership-forming one.49 
In Books VIII and IX of the Nicomachean Ethics and Book VII of the 
Eudemian Ethics, Aristotle discusses affiliation (philia).  Philia involves 
virtue50 and so is a basic aspect of the human good. 
Aristotle identifies several elements of philia.  One is  eunoia—
prominently translated “goodwill”;51  and another element is found in 
boulontai tagatha—prominently translated “wishing well.”52  Further elements 
are those of mutual knowledge53—mutual recognition—and reciprocity: “a 
mutual and recognized love.”54  “To be friends, [people] must be mutually 
recognized as bearing good will and wishing well to each other.”55  And 
furthermore friendship, at least in its higher form, involves  “reciprocal choice 
of the absolutely good and pleasant,”56 (and therefore, as part of choosing, 
reciprocal reasoning and judging)57 and “sharing in discussion and thought.”58  
 
 47. NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, supra note 33, at 1155a 5-6. 
 48. POLITICS 1253a 2-9.  (Here and throughout this Article the translation of the POLITICS 
quoted is the Jowett translation in II THE COMPLETE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 1986 (Jonathan 
Barnes, ed., 1984)).  The point here is not just that man tends to join a polis, it is that he tends to 
affiliate in groups of various sorts: politikon man is here contrasted not with tribal man or family 
man but with entirely isolated man: the “[t]ribeless, lawless, hearthless one.”  Id. at 4-5 (quoting 
ILIAD, at 9).  Man is also identified as politikon in POLITICS 1278b 19-21, in NICOMACHEAN 
ETHICS, supra note 33, at 1097b 12, 1162a 17-19, and 1169b 17-19, and in HISTORY OF ANIMALS 
488a 8-10. 
 49. “oikonomikov zoon” and “koinonikon anthropos.”  EUDEMIAN ETHICS 1242a 22-24.  
Here and throughout this Article the translation of the EUDEMIAN ETHICS is that by J. Solomon in 
II THE COMPLETE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE: THE REVISED OXFORD TRANSLATION 1922 (Jonathan 
Barnes, ed., 1984) (hereinafter EUDAEMONIAN ETHICS).  In context: “[M]an is not merely a 
political but also a household-maintaining animal, and his unions are not, like those of the other 
animals, confined to certain times, and formed with any chance partner, whether male or female, 
but . . . man has a tendency to partnership with those to whom he is by nature akin.”  Id. 
 50. NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, supra note 33, at 1155a 4. 
 51. “[G]oodwill when it is reciprocal being friendship.”  Id. at 1155b 33.  The term 
“goodwill” is prominent in the definition of eunoia in A GREEK-ENGLISH LEXICON compiled by 
HENRY GEORGE LIDDELL & ROBERT SCOTT 723 (Henry Stuart Jones, rev., 9th ed., 1940) and 
authorities cited. 
 52. NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, supra note 33, at 1156a 10. 
 53. “For many people have goodwill to those whom they have not seen but judge to be good 
or useful . . .  but how could one call them friends when they do not know their mutual feelings?”  
Id. at 1156a 1-3; see id. at 1167a 23-24. 
 54. Id. at 1156a 8. 
 55. Id. at 1156a 3-4. 
 56. EUDEMIAN ETHICS, supra note 49, at 1237a  31-32. 
 57. Since choice involves “consideration and deliberation.” EUDEMIAN ETHICS, supra note 
49, at 1226b 8  “Choice arises out of deliberate opinion.”  Id. at 1226a 8-9.  “[C]hoice is 
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Another element is expressed by philein (a verb with the same root as philos; it 
can mean “to love” but it can mean much less intense attitudes).59 
The inclusion, in the account of affiliation, of the element of reasoning and 
judging reflects the Aristotelean understanding of virtuous conduct generally.  
Fullness in Aristotelean virtue is never a matter of just doing good things; 
eudaemonia involves activity for the right reasons, with the participation of the 
mind and a correct disposition of will: 
[S]ome people who do just acts are not necessarily just, i.e. those who do the 
acts ordained by the laws either unwillingly or owing to ignorance or for some 
other reason and not for the sake of the acts themselves . . . so is it, it seems, 
that in order to be good one must be in a certain state when one does the 
several acts, i.e. one must do them as a result of choice and for the sake of the 
acts themselves.60 
A. Types of Affiliation 
Aristotle identifies three principal types of affiliation.  One is the affiliation 
of utility, in which each party affiliates with the other not “for” the other but 
“in virtue of some good which [he] gets from [the] other.”61  Examples of 
affiliations of utility include alliances between cities,62 relationships between a 
powerful man and those who are useful to him,63 and relations in commerce.64  
 
deliberate desire . . . I call it deliberate when deliberation is the source and cause of the 
desire . . . .”  Id. at 1226b 18-20. 
 58. NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, supra note 33, at 1170b 11-12. 
 59. It is translated with forms of the verb “to love” in the Ross translation of the ETHICS.  
But it can mean something different from eros and from agape, and can be found, according to 
Greek usage, not only between parent and child and husband and wife but also between host and 
guest. See the definition in LIDDELL & SCOTT, supra note 51.  A discussion of Greek words for 
love and related matters, with extensive references, is contained in I CESLAS SPICQ, O.P., 
THEOLOGICAL LEXICON OF THE NEW TESTAMENT 8-22 (James D. Ernest, trans., 1994).  Philein 
is discussed at some length in the RHETORIC, where Aristotle states: “We may describe friendly 
feeling [philein] towards anyone as wishing for him what you believe to be good things, not for 
your own sake but for his, and being inclined, so far as you can, to bring those things about.” 
(Here and throughout this Article the translation of the RHETORIC is that by  W. Rhys Roberts in 
II THE COMPLETE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE: THE REVISED OXFORD TRANSLATION 2152  (Jonathan 
Barnes, ed., 1984) (hereinafter RHETORIC)).  NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, supra note 33, at 1380b 34 
- 1381a 1.  This seems to be a “high” account of the word, requiring complete unselfishness.  But 
in the ensuing passage Aristotle extends it to cases inconsistent with this demanding 
interpretation: for example we have this disposition towards the enemies of our enemies, id. at 
1381a 16-17, and “to those who are willing to treat us well where money is concerned,” id. at 
1381a 20-21. 
 60. NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, supra note 33, at 1144a 14-20. 
 61. Id. at 1156a 11-12. 
 62. Id. at 1157a 27. 
 63. Id. at 1158a 28-29.  Or those who are “clever at doing what they are told.”  Id. at 1158a 
33-34. 
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A second type of affiliation is that of pleasure: each affiliates with the other 
owing to the pleasure he receives and confers.  Affiliations between “ready-
witted” people is Aristotle’s example.65  A third type is the “perfect” or “full” 
(teleios) affiliation: “Perfect friendship is the friendship of men who are good, 
and alike in excellence; for these wish well to the other qua good, and they are 
good in themselves.  Now those who wish well to their friends for their sake 
are most truly friends . . . .”66  Let us take a closer look at the first and the third 
types. 
1. The Affiliation of Utility 
One kind of connection might be composed of entirely selfish people who 
care only about what they take out of the relationship, each doing good for the 
other—perhaps paying a fair price—but motivated only by the desire to obtain 
good things for himself.  Bad men and animals can relate like this,67 and so can 
creditors and debtors, as Aristotle observed.68  But an affiliation of utility may 
be composed (why not?) of parties who are just persons in the full sense, not 
only doing what is just but also seeing and embracing the good of justice.  
Furthermore, the affiliation of utility involves reciprocity.  The parties are not 
complete strangers: they mutually recognize and know one another.  Each to 
some extent wills the other’s good.  Each wills the other’s good in doing 
justice and being just.  Each will the other’s good in affiliating. 
The connection of purely selfish people does not, except in a very limited 
way, involve eunoia, boulontai tagatha, mutuality, reciprocity, sharing in 
reason and thought or philein.  Its participants are not fully just: they “do just 
acts [but] are not necessarily just [in that they] . . . do the acts ordained by the 
laws either unwillingly or owing to ignorance or for some other reason and not 
for the sake of the acts themselves.”69  A utility affiliation, on the other hand, 
can involve eunoia, boulontai, tagatha and the exercise of virtues such as 
justice and benevolence.70  To illustrate the difference: the job is done; the 
 
 64. “Commercially minded” people are likely to form affiliations of utility.  Id. at 1157b 21-
22. 
 65. NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, supra note 33, at 1156a 12-17. 
 66. Id. at 1156b 7 et seq. 
 67. EUDEMIAN ETHICS, supra note 55, at 1236b 6-11. 
 68. NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, supra note 33, at 1167b 29-30 (creditors “have no friendly 
feeling for their debtors, but only a wish that they may be kept safe with a view to what is to be 
got from them.”)  The context here is not a discussion of the friendship of utility but rather a 
distinction between creditors and benefactors.  Note that the creditor is normally someone who 
has already done all that is required of him for his part of the affiliation of utility; perhaps it is 
therefore appropriate for him to set aside the limited philein which is appropriate to this kind of 
relationship. 
 69. NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, supra note 33, at 1144a 14-20. 
 70. “[W]ith respect to each [of the types of friendship] there is a mutual and recognized love, 
and those who love each other wish well to each other.” Id. at 1156a 8.  An important article to 
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employee departs without his paycheck: the employer of the first type hopes 
never to see him again; the employer of the second type tries to find the 
employee to pay him what he has earned. 
How, then, is the affiliate of utility different from the “perfect” friend, the 
affiliate of the third type?  It seems that the good intended by an affiliate of 
utility has limits that do not apply in a “perfect” friendship.  These limits are in 
part ones of quantity, in that each may help the other only to the extent that the 
other helps him; perhaps also ones of type, in that each may give only what is 
similar to what he gets back (allies offer military assistance in wartime but not 
economic sustenance during peacetime, traders exchange goods or money but 
not support in a fight).71  No doubt the limits also relate to motive; the affiliate 
of utility, although not thoroughly selfish, is not a thoroughly generous 
character either.  He aims at the good of the other because he sees that balance 
and evenhandedness is good rather than because he embraces the other’s 
welfare in general.  A further limit relates to consequences: the affiliate of 
utility intends to deliver the widgets but may not concern himself with their 
effects on the recipient’s life as a whole.  This illustrates a fundamental trait of 
the affiliation of utility: the affiliates are joined together superficially, not 
intimately.  Affiliates of utility may not care much about one another’s 
 
this effect is John M. Cooper, Aristotle on the Forms of Friendship, 30 REVIEW OF METAPHYSICS 
619 (1977), which defends the view that “in every friendship, of whichever of the three types, the 
friend will wish his friend whatever is good, for his own sake.”  Id. at 631.  To similar effect: 
BERNARD YACK, THE PROBLEMS OF A POLITICAL ANIMAL 37-39 (1993) (understanding Aristotle 
to allude to a disposition of people in an exchange relationship to favor the other party’s obtaining 
some (lesser) advantage).  See generally DOUGLAS B. RASMUSSEN & DOUGLAS J. DEN UYL, 
LIBERTY AND NATURE: AN ARISTOTELIAN DEFENSE OF LIBERAL ORDER 174-83 (1991) 
(defending the view that commercial relationships are affiliations of utility against the assertion 
that the parties lack good will and so cannot be philoi).  For further literature on this controversial 
subject, see Richard Mulgan, The Role of Friendship in Aristotle’s Political Theory, in 2 
CRITICAL REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL SOCIAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY NO. 4, at 15, 19-24 
(1999). 
  How do good will and benevolence fit in with the exchange?  Professors Cooper and 
Yack sometimes imply that they arise in a sort of psychological penumbra.  See Cooper, supra, at 
633-34 (Aristotle is making “the psychological claim that those who have enjoyed one another’s 
company or have been mutually benefited through their common association will, as a result of 
the benefits or pleasures they receive, tend to wish for and be willing to act in the interest of the 
other person’s good.”).  The good will, Cooper thinks, is secondary: “The overriding concern of 
the advantage-friend is for his own profit,” id. at 639, and his beneficent actions are only “small 
ones” which do not “cost him too much,” id. at 640. 
  But the better view is that good will and benevolence occupy a prominent and central 
position: they repose in the participants’ disposition each to do justice, each to act reciprocally 
and each to foster the good of justice and reciprocity in the other.  When the affiliate of utility is a 
just man, his commitments along these lines are not overriden by the desire for profit and his 
actions—paying what is owed, notably—may be big ones which do cost him much. 
 71. “[T]hose who love each other wish well to each other in that respect in which they love 
one another.”  NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, supra note 33, at 1156a 9-10. 
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characters,72 long-term projects and aspirations; they may not know much 
about them; they may not know one another more than superficially; they may 
exercise only to a very limited extent that mutual reasoning, judging and 
sharing in discussion and thought” which comes to its fullest in “perfect” 
friendship. 
2. The “Perfect” Friendship 
As to “perfect” friends: a simple view might be that each is entirely self-
abnegating, caring only for the good of the other and not at all for his own 
good.  But this would present a distorted picture.  Of course to participate in a 
friendship is a good; a part of happiness; an exercise of virtue; the “perfect” 
friend sees and appreciates this happy condition and enjoys it—why not? 
How, then, is the “perfect” friend different from the affiliate of utility?  It 
seems that what he gives is not limited the way it would be in an affiliation of 
utility: he does not limit what he gives to the amount or kind of thing he gets.  
He aims not only at the good of balance in the affiliation but also at the general 
good of the friend.  In determining what to give, he looks deeper than at what 
has been requested73 and considers the consequences—the “true good” of the 
friend.  In this way a “perfect” friendship involves knowing and caring about 
the other person in a way that an affiliation of utility need not. 
And what about the “return” or the goods the friend expects for himself?  
The practical benefits are less important to him than the virtue and intentions 
behind them;74 it is a good actually to have been befriended and to be the 
object of love.75  It is a greater thing still to be a bestower of love76 and a 
bestower of benefits77 and beneficence “is exercised chiefly and in its more 
 
 72. See POLITICS, supra note 48, at 1280b 2-4 (stating that as between cities who have 
commercial treaties with one another—affiliates of utility, it seems, by analogy to military allies, 
see NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, supra note 33, at 1157a 27, one city does not “take care that the 
citizens of the other are such as they ought to be, nor see that those who come under the terms of 
the treaty do no wickedness at all, but only that they do no injustice to one another.”). 
 73. See NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, supra note 33, at 1172b 20-22  (“[I]t is fitting to go unasked 
and readily to the aid of those in adversity for it is characteristic of a friend to render services, and 
especially to those who are in need and have not demanded them . . . .”). 
 74. See id. at 1172b 23 (“[W]hen our friends are prosperous we should . . . be tardy in 
coming forward to be the objects of their kindness, for it is not noble to be keen to receive 
benefits.”). 
 75. Id. at 1158a 25 (“In being loved . . . people delight for its own sake”). 
 76. See id. at 1168a 19-20 (“loving is like activity, being loved like passivity”); id. at 1159a 
33-34 (“loving seems to be the characteristic excellence of friends”). 
 77. To bestow a benefit is noble and pleasant and engenders a love for the person benefited, 
who is a sort of “handiwork” of the benefactor.  The same is not true in reverse: to receive a 
benefit does not necessarily have those characteristics and effects.  Id. at 1167a 16 et seq. 
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laudable form towards friends.”78  And among benefits, the greatest are those 
which confer excellence of character or assist in its development. 
Further, a friend develops a “consciousness of the existence of his friend” 
which is “realized in their living together and sharing in discussion and 
thought.”79  Each participates in the other’s decisions80 and actions81 and sees 
how the other participates in his own.  Through this “doubling” or “mirroring” 
each achieves an enhanced and more objective self-knowledge (since “[t]o 
perceive a friend must be in a way to perceive one’s self.  And to know a 
friend to know one’s self . . . .”).82 
 
 78. NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, supra note 33, at 1155a 7-9 (“[W]hat is the use of . . . prosperity 
without the opportunity of beneficence, which is exercised chiefly and in its more laudable form 
towards friends?”). 
 79. Id. at 1170b 11-12. 
 80. First, by perceiving them.  See EUDEMIAN ETHICS, supra note 49, at 1136b 5-6 
(friendship of the good “is peculiar to man, for he alone perceives another’s choices”).  Further, 
often by discussing those decisions and hashing them out together.  Further, it seems we are 
deeply involved in our friend’s choices even when we do not help formulate them.  An interesting 
account of various ways in which friends may choose together is contained in A.W. PRICE, LOVE 
AND FRIENDSHIP IN PLATO AND ARISTOTLE 119 (1989). 
 81. NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, supra note 33, at 1170a 1-3 (“[T]he blessed man will need 
friends of this sort [virtuous men], since he chooses to contemplate worthy actions and actions 
that are his own, and the actions of a good man who is his friend have both these qualities.”).  See 
id. at 1112b 27-28 (“[T]hings that might be brought about by our own efforts . . . in a sense 
include things that can be brought about by the efforts of our friends.”). 
 82. Self-perception through the mirror of friendship has a unique character, since it is “from 
the outside.”  When you act directly, you focus on the object of your action—your goal and the 
things that lead to it.  When your friend acts, you can also focus on him, the actor.  You always 
see other people that way; and when you see a friend that way you are enabled (since a friend is 
“another self”) to take the important step of seeing yourself that way as well.  See PRICE, supra 
note 80, AT 121-22: 
[I]n perception we become transparent to what we are perceiving, so that perceiving it and 
perceiving ourselves are the same mental act (something like seeing outside and seeing 
through a window). . . . [But if] I see a friend looking into my eyes, his looking is to me 
not transparent (as it is to him) but opaque, so that I see him looking into my eyes without 
thereby seeing them myself. . . . It is from him that I can learn most easily to distinguish 
the perceiver from the perceived; I then generalize to my own case. . . . [The] analogue 
with choice and action shared with a friend of similar character yields a richer self-
awareness: in my own person, my projects are (to extend the metaphor) transparent on to 
their objects, so that my focus is upon the objects, not my pursuit of them; but joining in 
those projects with a friend I become conscious of his pursuing them, and so conscious in 
a new way of pursuing them myself (for we are pursuing them together).  I thus become 
explicitly aware of myself not just abstractly as an agent, but as an agent with a certain 
character, thereby achieving not a bare self-consciousness but a real self-knowledge. 
  All of this allows us to see in a fuller way how beneficence is involved in friendship: you 
benefit a friend by conferring enhanced consciousness and augmented self-knowledge on him. 
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3. Choosing Between Types of Affiliation 
Either affiliation can be worthy of choice: the affiliation of utility or the 
“perfect” friendship. 
Circumstances often dictate which one to choose.  Usually conditions 
preclude “perfect” friendship since it “requires time and familiarity; as the 
proverb says, men cannot know each other till they have ‘eaten salt together’: 
nor can they admit each other to friendship or be friends till each has been 
found lovable and been trusted by each.”83  Further, since “perfect” friendship 
requires excellence of character (“only good men can be friends” of this 
type),84 it may also require equality of rank85 and similarity of character, tastes 
and ways of life.  Moreover, “perfect” friendship with one person may 
diminish your opportunities to be close friends with others: “[o]ne cannot be a 
friend to many people in the sense of having a friendship of the complete type 
with them.”86  Thus as a practical matter you cannot expect to develop more 
than an affiliation of utility with most of those—the butcher, the brewer and 
the baker—from whom you procure your dinner. 
How should one choose on those infrequent occasions when circumstances 
permit either form?  Some might argue that one ought always to aim at 
“perfect” friendship, in the view that the affiliation of utility is nothing more 
than an underdeveloped friendship and ought to be brought to full flower when 
possible.  But the affiliation of utility seems to have its own special goods.  For 
example, efficiency under certain circumstances:87  architects or builders asked 
to get some structures in place in a wartime emergency might reasonably 
minimize the personal side of their affiliations, choosing a fast-paced, non-
discursive decision-making structure; and they might abruptly terminate 
colleagues when appropriate in order to enhance output, choosing as 
replacements people who were good at the work but cold, taciturn, hard 
bargainers, fair to others but not interested in more than a superficial 
involvement. 
Another special good relates to self-knoweldge and the “mirroring” or 
“doubling” described above (“[t]o perceive a friend must be in a way to 
perceive one’s self”).  It seems that an affiliate of utility also holds up a mirror; 
in it, his affiliate sees himself from a different angle than would a close friend: 
 
 83. NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, supra note 33, at 1156b 26. 
 84. Id. at 1157a 18. 
 85. Id. at 1158b 12.  That said, “even unequals can be friends; they can be equalized.”  Id. at 
1159a 2-3. 
 86. Id. at 1158a 11-12.  See id. at 1171a 1 (“[F]or [good] friends too there is a fixed 
number—perhaps the largest number with which once can live together.”); Id. at 1171a 18-20.  
Perhaps the impediment is that the changes you go through to become a true friend of one person 
may be unhelpful to the possibility of your becoming friends with another. 
 87. This is not to say that the affiliation of utility is always more efficient.  Closer bonds 
produce efficiencies through loyalty. 
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from a further distance and therefore in a wider perspective, and no doubt in a 
less attractive light.  The unflattering mirror is also a source of self-knowledge.  
The virtues of good will and beneficence have a special character within the 
affiliation of utility.  The affiliate has good will in that he aims to foster his 
fellow affiliate’s efficiency and enhance his critically oriented self-knowledge. 
It seems, then, that in many circumstances affiliates might choose either 
form without being guilty of preferring lesser to greater goods.  It seems that 
the optimal social world would locate each of us in affiliations of various 
types. 
B. Types of Community; Affiliations Within Communities 
Associations comprised not only of two, but of several, people involve 
affiliations.  “For in every community there is thought to be some form of 
justice, and philia too; at least men address as philous their fellow-voyagers 
and fellow-soldiers, and so too those associated with them in any other kind of 
community.”88 
Communities, like affiliations between two people, each aim at some 
good.89  Can they, then, be arranged by purpose just like affiliations: some 
aiming at utility, some at pleasure and some at the good of their members “qua 
good,” “for their sakes”?  Aristotle explicitly invites such an arrangement or 
something “akin” to it,90 but also recognizes an additional category, called 
“political friendship.” 
1. Communities Devoted to Utility and Comprised of Utility Affiliations 
Groups aimed at utility seem easy to identify; Aristotle mentions trading 
associations and alliances among cities.91 
Utility groups, like two-party utility associations, seem to fall into two 
types: one a lower kind which even animals (like hives of bees) and bad men 
might form, the other a somewhat higher kind where each intends the others’ 
good, although in a limited way.  A business association, for example, might 
 
 88. NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, supra note 33, at 1159b 27.  I have altered the Ross-Urmson 
translation by substituting philia for “friendship” and philous for “friends.”  The term here 
translated “community” is koinonia. 
 89. POLITICS, supra note 48, at 1252a 1-2 (“[E]very community is established with a view to 
some good.”). 
 90. See EUDEMIAN ETHICS, supra note 49, at 1241b 15-17 (“[W]hatever be the number of 
species of friendship, there are the same of justice and partnership [koinonias]; these all border on 
one another, and the species of one have differences akin to those of the other.”); NICOMACHEAN 
ETHICS, supra note 33, at 1160a 29-30 (“[T]he particular kinds of friendship will correspond to 
the particular kinds of community.”). 
 91. As to alliances between cities, see NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, supra note 33, at 1157a 27-
28 (“For men apply the name of friends even to those whose motive is utility, in which sense 
states are said to be friendly (for alliances of states seem to aim at advantage).”). 
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be of the former type (an “extended conflict among selfish people”);92 on the 
other hand it might involve the higher kind of affiliation—a true utility 
affiliation—in which each member wishes a degree of good to the other, 
aiming for him to participate in the goods of doing justice and receiving fair 
treatment, efficiently producing a product and advancing in critical self-
knowledge.93 
Utility groups that are long-lived and involve complex projects may 
enhance and deepen utility affiliations.  In a business company that 
manufactures complex products, for example, each member may know quite a 
bit about how the business functions and how the product is produced and can 
intend the good of the other members in a thoroughly knowledgeable way; 
each member can perceive and in a way even experience the work of other 
members of the firm.  Continuous discours—planning—strengthens their 
bonds. 
2. Communities of “Perfect” Friendship? 
What about groups comprised of “perfect” friends?  They must be very 
difficult to establish and maintain.  It is hard enough to establish the conducive 
conditions for “perfect” friendship between only two people, and with groups 
the difficulties are multiplied: 
[F]or friends . . . there is a fixed number—perhaps the largest number with 
whom one can live together . . . one cannot live with many people and divide 
oneself up among them . . . .  Further, they too must be friends of one another, 
if they are all to spend their days together; and it is a hard business for this 
condition to be fulfilled with a large number.  It is found difficult, too, to 
rejoice and to grieve in an intimate way with many people, for it may likely 
happen that one has at once to be merry with one friend and to mourn with 
another.94 
Further, it seems that large groups with complex goals need hierarchy; but 
inequality is an impediment to “perfect” friendship. 
 
 92. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 16, at 8. 
 93. See GRISEZ, supra note 8, at 336, Volume Two. 
The community can be limited to cooperation in a specified act or set of acts for the sake 
of their specified purpose or set of purposes . . . .  [I]nterpersonal relationship between or 
among the community members is not sought for its own sake.  Still, the common action 
of the agents constitutes community insofar as they seek to benefit one another not out of 
pure self-interest but out of willingness to join a fair and otherwise just relationship.  For 
example . . . a group of men form an equitable business partnership. 
Id. 
 94. NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, supra note 33, at 1171a 1-9. 
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3. The Political Community; Political Friendship 
The polis is not, according to Aristotle, similar to a trading association or a 
military alliance: 
[A] state exists for the sake of a good life, and not for the sake of life only . . . .  
Nor does a state exist for the sake of alliance and security from injustice nor 
yet for the sake of exchange and mutual intercourse; for then the Tyrrhenians 
and the Carthaginians, and all who have commercial treaties with one another, 
would be the citizens of one state. . . . [But in those arrangements each state 
does not] take care that the citizens of the other are such as they ought to be, 
nor see that those who come under the terms of the treaty do no wrong or 
wickedness at all, but only that they do no injustice to one another.  Whereas, 
those who care for good government take into consideration political 
excellence and defect.  Whence it may be further inferred that excellence must 
be the care of a state which is truly so called, and not merely enjoys the name: 
for without this end the community becomes a mere alliance which differs only 
in place from alliances of which the members live apart; and law is only a 
convention, “a surety to one another of justice” . . . and has no real power to 
make the citizens good and just. 
  . . . . 
  Let us suppose that one man is a carpenter, another a farmer, another a 
shoemaker, and so on, and that their number is ten thousand: nevertheless, if 
they have nothing in common but exchange, alliance, and the like, that would 
not constitute a state. . . . [E]ven supposing that such a community were to 
meet in one place . . . and that they made alliance with one another, but only 
against evil-doers; still an accurate thinker would not deem this to be a state, if 
their intercourse with one another was of the same character after as before 
their union.  It is clear then that a state is not a mere society, having a common 
place, established for the prevention of mutual crime and for the sake of 
exchange.  These are conditions without which a state cannot exist; but all of 
them together do not constitute a state, which is a community of families and 
aggregations of families in well-being, for the sake of a perfect and self-
sufficing life.95 
A properly formed polis is not a utility affiliation.96  One can adduce 
further reasons for this conclusion: The polis aims at stability and permanence, 
 
 95. POLITICS, supra note 48, at 1280a 31 - 1280b 35.  For other relevant passages, see 
ROBERT GEORGE, MAKING MEN MORAL: CIVIL LIBERTIES AND PUBLIC MORALITY 21-28 
(1993).  See EUDEMIAN ETHICS, supra note 49, at 1242b 6 (“Civic friendship has been 
established mainly in accordance with utility; for men seem to have come together because each 
is not sufficient for himself . . . .”). 
 96. But cf. RASMUSSEN & DEN UYL, supra note 70, at 184 et seq. (1991) (maintaining that 
civic friendships in Aristotle are affiliations of advantage); YACK, supra note 70, at 114, passim 
(stating that political friendship is a “shared advantage friendship”).  Yack also writes: 
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but affiliations of utility are unstable and often a source of complaints.  In 
order to defend itself in war, the polis needs to be able to call upon its citizens 
for heroic sacrifices; ones which a man would not make for a trading partner.  
The polis aims not just at one instance of human flourishing but at many and it 
engages not in one project but a vast range of activities; it therefore needs to 
call upon its citizens for contributions which go beyond anything which could 
be agreed to at a formation-stage bargaining table.  It requires trust of a type 
seldom elicited by the utility affiliation.  It develops a range of goods many of 
which cannot be “taken away” and enjoyed separately by a citizen the way a 
business associate can take away his profit or an athlete can quit his training 
group and compete elsewhere.  Breaking away from his city, the citizen loses a 
part of himself and terminates forever the exercise of a range of excellences.  
Furthermore, citizenship in a worthwhile polity involves a development of the 
consciousness, a “sharing in discussion and thought”—political discourse—
and a sharing by each in the actions and thought of the others. 
Another possibility, then, is that all citizens are “perfect friends,” as might 
at first seem to be implied by Aristotle’s statements that the polis aims at the 
promotion of virtue,97 but this is preposterous.  A day’s visit to any polity, 
however distinguished, will reveal that many citizens are not loyal friends; 
most cannot be owing to the arduous conditions required for “perfect” 
friendship described above.  Perhaps indeed they should not work that way, 
since the arms’-length aspect of human interaction seems to have its own 
distinctive goods, as argued above.  When everyone is close friends with 
everyone no one is truly a close friend of anyone.98  “Unity there should be, 
both of the family and of the state, but in some respects only.”99 
A third possibility is that citizenship involves its own special kind of 
friendship.100  This is suggested by Aristotle’s reference to the friendship 
 
Aristotle insists that it is contrary to nature (or is self-deceiving) to treat activities 
established for the sake of mutual advantage as if they were being performed for their 
own sake.  Those who share in citizenship, just like those who share in an economic 
association or voyage, share in an attempt to promote an end that will be to their mutual 
advantage.  When they treat each other as ‘ethical’ friends, they are merely fooling 
themselves . . . . 
Id. at 116. 
 97. In the lengthy quote from the POLITICS shortly supra and perhaps by implication in 
NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, supra note 33, at 1129b 12-26 (indicating that the law aims at all the 
virtues). 
 98. Cf. POLITICS, supra note 48, at 1263b 16-17 (rejecting the argument that if communism 
in property is introduced “in some wonderful manner everybody will become everybody’s 
friend”; this implies that in a well-ordered constitution everybody is not everybody’s friend). 
 99. Id. at 1263b 31-32. 
 100. See generally A.W. Price, Friendship and Politics, 61 TIJSDSCHRIFT VOUR FILOSOFIE 
525 (1999). 
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“proper to fellow-citizens”101 and his use of the term “political friendship.”  
Here is a crucial passage: 
Unanimity also seems to be a friendly relation. . . . [W]e . . . say that a city is 
unanimous when men have the same opinion about what is to their interest, 
and choose the same actions, and do what they have resolved in common.  It is 
about things to be done, therefore, that people are said to be unanimous, and, 
among these, about matters of consequence and in which it is possible for both 
or all parties to get what they want; e.g. a city is unanimous when all its 
citizens think that the offices in it should be elective . . . .  Unanimity seems, 
then, to be political friendship, as indeed it is commonly said to be; for it is 
concerned with things that are to our interest and have an influence on our 
life.102 
The third possibility seems to be correct: citizens are affiliated in a way 
which can be is located between the utility affiliation and “perfect” friendship, 
involving, as utility affiliation does not, a high degree of commitment among 
its participants but focused, as “perfect” friendship is not, on the public sector 
of life: on public actions and civic goods.103  It would be anachronistic to 
understand Aristotle to delineate a private sphere immune from the concerns of 
the polis, but neither did he commend a communism in which everything is 
equally public, others far less so.  Political friendship pertains principally to the 
public order, and focuses on the promotion especially of those virtues which 
relate to citizenship (“political excellence and defect”) and which promote 
peace, harmony and the common endeavors of citizens.  Experience supports 
this view: fellow citizens praise and blame one another for character traits and 
courses of conduct—courage or cowardice in wartime, for example, or honesty 
or corruption in office—which bear on the common projects of the polis; 
whereas for traits which are off to the side of public life—tastes and skills in 
art; lines of thought about metaphysics; fidelity in love—they prefer to mind 
their own business. 
 
[W]ithin the phrase “civic friendship”, the term “civic” is, to a degree, alienans.  Aristotle 
is tempted . . . to classify such friendship as a form of utility-friendship; but . . . a more 
deeply Aristotelean view . . . makes friendship an extended form of perfect . . . or real . . . 
friendship, retaining the goodwill, etiolating the intimacy, and largely aspiring to the 
similarity. 
Id. at 542. 
 101. POLITICS, supra note 48, at 1171a 16-18.  “In the way proper to fellow-citizens . . . it is 
possible to be the friend of many and yet not be obsequious but a genuinely good man; but one 
cannot have with many people the friendship based on excellence and on the character of our 
friends themselves . . . .”  Id. at 1171a 16-21. 
 102. NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, supra note 33, at 1167a 21-1167b 4. 
 103. Cf. SUZANNE STERN-GILLET, ARISTOTLE’S PHILOSPOHY OF FRIENDSHIP 159 (1995) 
(“civic friendship . . . involves [people] qua citizens only”). 
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The basic elements of philia take on a public focus within the political 
affiliation.  Citizens in a well-formed polity have political goodwill towards 
one another and wish one another well as regards public goods.  They are 
outraged when a neighbor’s freedom is threatened, or his franchise; not so 
when his solvency is in jeopardy.  Citizens develop their reciprocity in the area 
of political goods: public support earns public support in return, not money or 
private affection.  They are self-sacrificing in defense of political goods, as in 
wartime.  They reason and judge together about political things.  Political 
friends share political knowledge, and a sort of public consciousness, founded 
on a common public culture.  Perhaps citizens even share a sort of public or 
political love.104 
Furthermore, political friendship involves agreement (homonoia): actually 
accepting the same beliefs about political things (such as “that the offices . . . 
should be elective”).  In this regard the conditions for political friendship are 
actually more demanding than those for “perfect” friendship.  It seems that a 
monarchist and a republican might well be “perfect” friends; but they could not 
be members of the same political party or fully consenting and agreeing 
citizens in the same polity. 
4. Affiliations of Various Sorts Within the Polis 
Because of political friendship’s subject-matter specificity, and because of 
its intermediation through the polis, political friendship can be enjoyed 
compatibly with other forms of affiliation; citizens can at the same time be 
affiliates of utility; others can be “perfect” friends.  Similarly, they can form 
groups aimed at utility or pleasure or to perform specific projects like manning 
a ship.  A polis contains many groups, each with its own kind and degree of 
affiliation; each “seem[s] to be [a] part of the political community”105 and is 
shaped by the polis without being dissolved in political affiliation. 
C. Justice Within Communities 
Aristotle seems to tell us that justice works differently according to the 
type of community: 
For in every community there is thought to be some form of justice, and 
friendship too; at least men address as friends their fellow-voyagers and 
fellow-soldiers, and so too those associated with them in any other kind of 
community.  And the extent of their association is the extent of their 
 
 104. See generally Terence Irwin, The Good of Political Activity, in ARISTOTLE’S ‘POLITEK’: 
AKTEN DES XI. SYMPOSIUM ARISDTOTELICUM 1987, 73, 94 (Herausgegeben Patzig, ed., 1990) 
(“If I know another person is a virtuous fellow-citizen I know . . . that I have reason to regard him 
as another self; for I know that I share with him the virtuous aim of maintaining the 
comprehensive association of the city.”). 
 105. NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, supra note 33, at 1160a 29. 
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friendship, as it is the extent to which justice exists between them. . . . Now 
brothers and comrades have all things in common, but the others have definite 
things in common—some more things, others fewer; for of friendships, too, 
some are more and others less truly friendships.  And the claims of justice 
differ too; the duties of parents to children and those of brothers to each other 
are not the same, nor those of comrades and those of fellow-citizens, and so, 
too, with the other kinds of friendship.106 
V.  ARISTOTELEAN THOUGHT APPLIED TO BUSINESS COMPANIES 
These insights from Aristotle suggest two approaches to structuring 
business companies. 
A. Affiliations of Utility: The Nexus-of-Contracts Company 
One kind of company could reasonably be formed as a nexus of utility 
affiliations: as a utility group, pursuant to the discussion in Section IV.B.1 of 
this Article, supra. 
In the company of this type, relationships among the participants can be 
compared to the relations between strangers who make contracts with one 
another for purchases and sales.  The rights and duties of the participants are 
few and most are clearly specified.  Relationships may be short term and easily 
terminated.  No one is bonded “for better or for worse ‘til death do them part”; 
no special value is placed on stability.  Products and production techniques 
may be quickly altered as market trends suggest; so also may company 
structures and goals. 
The involvement of the parties with one another is limited; the purposes of 
one party overlap only to a limited extent with the purposes of another.  Each 
wishes a just outcome for the others—for example the employer intends to pay 
a fair wage and will seek out a departed employee to give him his final 
paycheck; the worker intends to give a fair day’s work and will do his work up 
to standard even when he might shirk undetected.  Each intends a just and 
well-ordered participation by the others: for example the employer will want 
each employee to contribute, and to understand that he is contributing, fair 
value for his pay.  On the other hand, the concern of the participants for one 
another has its limits.  The employer may take no interest in what the employee 
is doing with his wages nor in how well he is progressing towards his career 
goals.  The employee, for his part, may have little concern about the 
company’s long-term success or about the customers’ use of the product. 
 
 106. Id. at 1159b 27-1160a 3.  The term here translated “community” is koinonia. 
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B. “Company Friendship”: The Closely Bonded Company107 
Another kind of company is formed, not of “perfect” friendships, but of 
bonds analogous to those among citizens.  Aristotle used the term “political 
friendship” for that; we can invent the term “company friendship” for this 
context. 
Participants in a closely bonded company aspire to a degree of solidarity: 
their commitments to one another are extensive and go beyond what may have 
been specified in any agreement.  People are expected to stick with the 
company through thick and thin and the company stands by its people in bad 
times too.  Products, production techniques and company structures are stable.  
People have important common purposes and goals, perhaps a common 
company culture.  Participants embrace the good of producing a good product 
for reasons that look beyond profit.  The company, in determining how to mold 
its business and how to treat its employees, takes account of their careers and 
work situations to a greater extent than contract or simple, chilly justice would 
require.  The participants make the company’s projects a fundamental concern 
of their own.  Participants share a certain moral identity: not to the same extent 
as can members of a close family or citizens of a country, but in a fashion that 
goes well beyond the commonality of those who are merely affiliates of utility. 
On the other hand, people in the firm are seldom “perfect” friends.  
Outside the firm, and in affairs not connected with the business, as when one 
sells another his car, their relations may be conducted on an entirely arms’-
length basis. 
C. The Two Types of Company Compared 
The difference is not between product-oriented organizations versus 
inward-directed ones.  Utility-affiliation companies do not aim exclusively at 
extrinsic goals, like selling widgets or shoes, and closely bonded companies do 
not strive mainly to cultivate good relationships among their participants, 
putting that ahead of making a good product.  A utility-affiliation company 
may aim largely at profit whereas a closely bonded association may aim 
principally at the accomplishment of the mission and construct its 
understanding of the good of participants by reference to that end.  A fishing 
crew whose village is short of food may operate this way, for example, or a 
medical team assisting soldiers in combat.  Deep commitment to success in 
such cases produces the solidarity among the participants. 
The difference is not between tough organizations and nice ones.  Each 
type should be tough in its own way.  A utility-affiliation company might 
reasonably demand big changes from Darlene (the single parent) whereas a 
closely bonded one might demand big changes from Hayes (the careerist).  
 
 107. “Closely bonded” is not intended as a synonym for “closely held.” 
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Firmness, determination, and even in a certain sense ruthlessness, provided 
they are deployed in support of appropriate goods, under the right 
circumstances, and towards the right people, are also truly human. 
D. Choosing Between Types of Business Company 
Quentin Peters and people in his position therefore should consider 
carefully which type of company is optimal for their situation.  (They may tend 
too readily to prefer the utility-affiliation type of company owing to impatience 
or an itch for exclusive control.)108 
Each type of company has its own merits.  Utility-affiliation companies 
instantiate the robust virtues of fortitude and self-reliance.  They respect the 
independence of their members.  They isolate and highlight a certain kind of 
justice: square dealing.  They are amenable to regulation and stand up well in 
the courthouse: judges and juries do a good job with arms’-length relationships 
whose guiding principles are clearly specified in contract-like documents.109  
Closely bonded companies can involve a more deeply personal set of goods: 
those of solidarity, comradeship, and a kind of friendship.  They tend to 
promote the special sort of justice—“intimate reciprocity”—that applies 
between friends and other close affiliates.  They can develop the stability and 
self-discipline that makes litigation unnecessary. 
Which best to choose may depend on circumstances.  One important 
variable concerns the type of people involved and the type of culture from 
which they are drawn.  A river freight operation in a robust frontier society—
where people habitually treat one another in a fair but arms’-length way and 
have a knack for that approach and no other110 and a moral culture to back it 
up, often move on, need their returns fast and develop their deeper social and 
political affiliations through family ties and democratic institutions—calls for 
the utility-affiliation mode of bonding.  A furniture manufacturer in a Shaker 
village or a publishing company in a European cultural center is likely to 
evolve as a closely bonded company. 
Which form is most efficient seems also to depend on the situation.  A 
business which makes Waterford crystal or Shaker furniture and which uses 
 
 108. Cf. GRISEZ, supra note 8, at 206, Volume One (“One should not be pressed by 
enthusiasm or impatience to act individuallistically. . . . Unnecessary individualism is not 
consistent with a will toward integral human fulfillment, which requires a fellowship of persons 
sharing in goods.”) (emphasis omitted). 
 109. A telling argument along these lines, in support of the traditional view that the purpose 
of the business corporation is to maximize profits, is advanced in ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, 
CORPORATE LAW §1.2 at 20-21 & ch. 16 (1986). 
 110. See generally Stephen M. Bainbridge,  Corporate Decisionmaking and the Moral Rights 
of Employees: Participatory Management and Natural Law, 43 VILL. L. REV. 741, 767 (1998) 
(describing studies which reveal that many workers do not like and are ill suited for participatory 
work structures). 
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worker skills that take years to develop, relies on a carefully nurtured 
reputation and employs a very long-term market strategy, seems likely to be 
best in a closely bonded form.  Close bonds of loyalty to younger members and 
future owners give management an incentive to protect the long-term 
profitability of the business.111 
E. Avoiding Distorted Forms 
1. Distorted Versions of the Utility-Affiliation Company are to be 
Avoided 
An organization can fall into a pattern in which it is not robust but 
rapacious.  It can neglect the obligations of justice among its participants.  
Much in mainstream ideology leads to this sort of distortion: classic 
Benthamite utilitarianism, for example, leaves little place for any principle of 
equality in exchanges. 
Participants in such a company may eschew even a limited commitment to 
the quality of its product.  Minimalism in reciprocity among members may 
lead to inefficiencies, as the web of communication and mutual support grows 
too attenuated even to support productive work.112 
2. Distorted Versions of the Closely Bonded Company are to be Avoided 
An organization can fall into a pattern in which it is not closely bonded but 
totalitarian.113  A closely bonded business must involve the deeper goods of the 
participants in a way that does not misunderstand or distort human flourishing. 
3. Structures Involving Both Kinds of Distortions are to be Avoided 
They are not uncommon.  In some companies, utility-affiliation is the 
official ideology but close bonding emerges unofficially as participants are 
pressed together in an intense way over long periods of time.  In other 
companies, close bonding is the illusion: management emphasizes group 
loyalty but its personnel policies are chilly.114  Covert affiliational practices are 
likely also to be distorted ones. 
 
 111. See generally James S. Harvey, Owner as Manager, Extended Horizons and the Family 
Firm, 6 INT’L. J. ECONOMICS OF BUSINESS 1 (1999). 
 112. A company which seems to have suffered from such problems is described in  TIMOTHY 
LEWONTIN, PARSONS’ MILL (1989). 
 113. As in the case of the Ford Motor Company during some of its years under Henry Ford.  
See ROBERT LACEY, FORD: THE MEN AND THE MACHINE (1986); FORD, supra note 3. 
 114. Cf. NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, supra note 33, at 1165b 4-7 (“[O]ne might complain of 
another if, when he loved us for our usefulness or pleasantness, he pretended to love us for our 
character.  For . . . most differences arise between friends when they are not friends in the spirit in 
which they think they are. “).  See also EUDEMIAN ETHICS, supra note 49, at 1242b 38 - 1243a 2 
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VI.  BACK TO THE THEOLOGICAL AUTHORITIES AND QUENTIN PETERS’ 
QUESTIONS 
A. The Theological Authorities 
Some of the apparent contradictions noted above arise from discussing two 
types of entity in one doctrinal breath.  Characterizing the “master-servant” 
relationship as based on profit-guided contracting makes sense in the context 
of one kind of entity; mandating special care by the employer and loyalty on 
the part of the employee make sense for the other sort.  Emphasizing 
proficiency as a guide to pay and employee retention makes sense in one 
context; emphasizing employee needs such as that of a worker to maintain 
himself in “frugal comfort” makes more sense in another. 
Further distortions may arise from misunderstanding about the ethical 
structure of each sort of entity.  Characterizing the entity as a product of 
contract and characterizing contract as a product of the wills of the parties115 
leads to a neglect of the “substantive” side: the goods of reciprocity and philia 
which are served even by utility-affiliation firms.  Characterizing the entity as 
a sort of household or family leads to an exaggeration of company intimacy 
and may imply that company members are “perfect” friends. The approach 
suggested above—using the analogy of political friendship rather than 
“perfect” friendship—avoids these potential distortions. 
B. Quentin Peters’ Questions 
If QP Corporation is a utility-affiliation company (reasonably and 
consistently so), then it can licitly pay Jud and Darlene off and fire them or it 
can keep them on and pay them less because they contribute less; it can do 
those things without worrying over how their private lives may be affected; 
and it can reassign people and demand more or less work (for more or less pay 
of course) without even worrying too much over how their working lives are 
affected, since affiliations of utility focus on product and exchange and to only 
a limited extent on the persons behind the exchange.  QP Corporation can 
properly then use its employees as apparatniks and exclude them from 
company decision-making and does not have to put them in the picture as to 
company policy nor see to it that they have interesting tasks; and the 
employees, for their parts, need not extend their loyalty to the company beyond 
keeping their promises—doing what is in their job descriptions—and giving a 
fair day’s work for a fair day’s pay.  Employees’ lives off the job are their own 
 
(describing as “unnatural” and susceptible to recrimination those associations which are “really 
for the sake of utility” but which are represented as “moral, like that of good men”). 
 115. As in  I SLATER, supra note 4, at 300, 305 (“[A contract] is an agreement of wills; one 
renounces a right in favour of the other who accepts it.”). 
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business and only theirs: the company normally need not concern itself with 
how Darlene is coping with her child-care problems.  QP Corporation in this 
form need not and should not object to the attitude of Hayes, the ambitious 
employee in Donna’s department who is taking MBA courses at night and 
avoiding overtime.  Jake the stockholder can sell his shares and does not have 
to inquire whether his purchaser is planning to change the way the company 
does business. 
All of this is not to suggest, of course, that profit-making and adhering to 
promises are the whole story.  At the heart of the utility-affiliation company is, 
not the “bad man” form of association but the higher form of affiliation in 
which fairness plays a central part, as described above.  If the especially 
diligent employees in Donna’s department do more work than their contracts 
require when the company is in a crunch, the company should compensate 
them extra. 
On the other hand, if QP Corporation is a closely bonded company which 
has—reasonably in accordance with the criteria suggested above—been 
organized and maintained to work in accordance with “company friendship,” 
then many of these problems will call for the opposite sort of resolution.  Jud 
should be transferred and given different work rather than fired; Darlene’s job, 
similarly, should be reshaped to help her out with her difficult child care 
situation and the employees, for their part, should display an augmented degree 
of devotion to the company, learning their jobs thoroughly, figuring out how 
their work fits into the firm as a whole, making suggestions for improvement 
and helping out the firm with extra work, perhaps for deferred extra 
compensation, in periods of crisis.  The company should listen to them and 
give them, if not partner-like status, at least a share in the company’s 
“constitution”—”the active participation of everybody in administration is to 
be encouraged.”116  Hayes should be prodded to rethink his commitments.  
Shutting down divisions without compelling reason is contrary to the moral 
structure of a firm like this and an investor should not sell out to a shark who 
will. 
But there are limits to the appropriate closeness of even a closely bonded 
company.  Its members are bonded by “company friendship” not “perfect” 
friendship; company friendship focuses on company-related consequences.  
Compensation policy illustrates the difference.  A closely bonded company, 
looking beyond the “value of the services rendered” measure of pay, sets its 
compensation with an eye to sustaining its employees as productive members 
of the firm.  It aims to maintain them in at least that condition—“frugal 
comfort”117—consistent with full participating membership in the company; 
and when an employee incurs especially intense economic or social problems, 
 
 116. Gaudium et spes, supra note 9, ¶68. 
 117. As referred to in Leo XIII, Rerum Novarum, May 15, 1891, supra note 4. 
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such as those of Darlene the single parent, it reasonably may aim to alleviate 
those problems as a part of sustaining her participation.  But it need not look 
still further and aim at achieving aspects of employee well-being far removed 
from company affairs. It need not pay a musically gifted employee enough to 
enable him to purchase a Steinway.  A “perfect” friend would help Darlene 
meet a suitable young man but the company need not do that.  A “perfect” 
friend would be very concerned to influence Ned in the right way as concerns 
his interest in religious cults but the company need not do that. 
VII.  CONCLUSION: TRUE HUMAN COMMUNITY 
This Article indicates ways of progressing towards the “truly human” 
companies recommended in the encyclicals. 
It warns Quentin Peters and all those who organize and manage business 
away from affiliative modes founded on illusory or insufficient goods like 
pleasure and preference-satisfaction.  It warns them away from “false human 
communities”: distorted forms where company participants are enemies or 
where they indulge an illusory or disingenuous intimacy. 
 
